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Abstract 
For MENA countries, transitioning to renewables primarily depends on transnational challenges of financial and infrastructural 
nature that cannot be tackled at national level. New renewable energy cooperation structures with the MENA were recently 
established in an attempt to manage interdependence problems. Drawing on a case study of renewable energy policy and markets 
in the MENA, this article aims at assessing the actual capacity of emerging cooperation structures to thoroughly manage the 
governance gap behind the transition to renewable energy technologies across the MENA. This article argues that politics have 
prevailed over policy, with concrete negative implications in terms of renewable energy finance towards the MENA. It concludes 
that far more synergic governance structures are needed to overcome the many (non-political) barriers that still hinder the take-up 
of renewables across the MENA. 
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1. Introduction 
Energy consumption and CO2 emissions are growing extremely fast in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. Energy demand is projected to increase by 70% by 2030, depending by 87% on fossil fuels [1]. In 
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response to these concerns, MENA countries are seeking to tap its superior renewable energy potential – among the 
most promising in the world [2]. Wind and solar power have the potential to cover up to 100% of local energy need 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and up to 15% of such need in Europe by 2050 [3]. 
Transitioning to renewables primarily depends on transnational challenges of financial and infrastructural nature 
that cannot be tackled at national level. Developing renewables is capital intensive, therefore demanding high 
upfront costs that Mediterranean countries cannot afford alone. For renewable energy projects – in particular, 
concentrated solar power (CSP) – to be profitable in the MENA at present, concessional finance as well an export- 
option of green electricity to Europe are needed [4]. This also entails the creation of further cross-border 
interconnections. Renewable energy investment potential in MENA is expected to reach $45 billion up to 2020 [5]. 
To cope with these transnational challenges, new cooperation structures have been established at different levels. 
At regional level, the European Union (EU) and its MENA neighbours launched in 2008 the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan –  a regional initiative of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) aimed at developing 20 Gigawatts of 
additional installed renewable energy capacity in region by 2020 along with the necessary electricity transmission 
capacity and cross-border interconnections [6]. At financial level, a US$ 5.6 Billion MENA CSP Investment Plan 
endorsed by Clean Technology Fund (CTF) is being implemented by the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank. At industrial and technical level, three private industrial consortiums (i.e. Desertec Industrial Initiative, 
Medgrid, Res4Med) and a number of technical platforms have been established. 
Yet developments in the region have been extremely limited at project level. Investment attraction is still lagging 
behind. Many experts and investors have warned about the importance of closing the governance gap in order to 
leverage investment and bring about a broad transition to renewable energy in the MENA. Yet, it is unclear if there 
is a direct correlation between governance and renewable energy investment. The aim of this article is (a) to shed 
light on the neglected nexus between governance and finance; and (b) to investigate how far policy and regional 
cooperation can facilitate the creation of a favourable environment for renewable energy investment in the MENA. 
This article argues that politics have prevailed over policy, with concrete negative implications at financing level. 
Emerging structures of renewable energy cooperation were not able to reduce the governance gap in the MENA and 
leverage finance towards the region. Thus, far more synergic governance structures are needed if we ever want to 
overcome the many (non-political) barriers behind a broad transition to renewables across the MENA. 
The remainder of the article is the following: I firstly explore the renewable energy finance landscape in the 
MENA. Then I study the new patterns of sectoral cooperation and evaluate their actual capacity to manage the 
governance gap in the region. In the last section I discuss the results of the empirical analysis and make a number of 
conclusions on the most/least-likely scenarios. 
2. Renewable energy investment in the MENA is lagging behind 
To fully understand renewable energy investment in the MENA, three are the crucial issues to be explored. From 
an investment perspective, first of all, what are the most attractive types of renewable energy technologies at global 
level today? The largest investment is directed to wind and solar, topping the list, followed by biomass, biofuels, 
energy smart technologies, small hydro and geothermal [7]. The reasons behind this trend are the advancement of 
technology at a given time, the commercial profitability of a specific clean technology over the others, and the 
profitability of a specific clean technology type for electricity generation vis-á-vis fossil fuel electricity generation. 
This may look like great news for the MENA, which has a great potential for photovoltaic (PV), on-shore/off 
shore wind (mainly in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey) and by far the largest CSP potential in the world. PV 
and wind have a cheaper cost of energy as compared to CSP, which is very slowly progressing along its cost curve. 
CSP developments have been limited to hybrid plants, demonstration projects and targets on paper. Nevertheless, 
CSP holds a great potential. The advantages of CSP lies in the fact that electricity can be supplied 24 hours-a-day, 7 
days-a-week, 365 days-a-year with no need for a fossil fuel back-up. The disadvantages of CSP are the high upfront 
costs. Heat storage costs are high at the moment, and further technology development is needed to bring costs down. 
For CSP to be profitable in the MENA, concessional finance and export of clean electricity to Europe are needed. 
From a technological perspective, the export option is feasible but very expensive. Clean electricity is commonly 
produced and dispatched locally. Among other technical reasons, this is because the further electric power is 
transported the greater the transmission losses. With the advent of High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) cables, 
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electric power transmission over long distances is now possible with comparatively low distribution losses. 
Secondly, what is the MENA share within global renewable energy finance landscape? The answer tells us a 
different story. The total investment towards the MENA substantively increased from $0.5 billion in 2004 to $10.4 
billion in 2012 and $9 billion in 2011[8]. Despite its vast untapped potential, the MENA hardly accounted for more 
than 1 percent of the global total renewable energy investment between 2004 and 2011; and registered its maximum 
in 2012 and 2013, reaching 4 percent of the global total renewable energy investment [9]. The largest shares within 
the whole region went to Egypt with $490 million for a 200 megawatt wind project in the Gulf of El Zayt, jointly 
funded by the European Investment Bank and German development bank KfW; and to Morocco with $635 million 
for the 160 megawatt Ouarzazate Noor I CSP project. Financing was secured from multiple donors, with the CTF 
leading the way with a $197 million concessional loan. Subsidies are aimed at generating economies of scale in 
equipment manufacturing that can progressively bring costs down [10]. 
Thirdly, why does the MENA score so low? The key answer to this question is that what power investors look for 
when investing in a development country is, first of all, the country policy risk [11]. The more uncertain rules are, 
the more risky the investment. A survey conducted by the World Bank shows how this factor is considered as a 
“deal breaker” [11]. International power investors need predictability and consistency. As a business representative 
puts it: “if you go for renewables for five years, stay there for five years. When a government changes the rules of 
the game, we can’t do anything. We are dead [12]”. 
    Table 1. Renewable energy investment in the MENA, $ Billion (2004-2013) [13] 
Unit ($bn per year) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
MENA 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.6 2.3 1.4 4.3 3.2 10.4 9.0 
World total 39.5 64.5 99.6 145.9 171.2 168.4 226.7 279.4 249.5 214.4 
MENA share of world total 1,2% 0,7% 0,9% 1,1% 1,3% 0,8% 1,9% 1,1% 4,1% 4,1% 
 
In this context, it is yet unclear how far emerging cooperation structures can go with closing the governance gap 
and creating a favourable environment for renewable energy investment towards the MENA. 
3. Can renewable energy cooperation reduce the governance gap in the MENA? 
This section studies the renewable energy actor configurations in the MENA and evaluates the actual capacity of 
new cooperation structures to close the governance gap and leverage finance towards the region - pointing out their 
main shortcomings as well as a number of negative and positive lessons learned. The underlying assumption of 
governance theories is that interdependence problems between political units generate demand for cooperation. In 
other words, the renewable energy cooperation patterns in the MENA can be conceived of as structures through 
which political units manage their interdependence. I argue that early intergovernmental choices ultimately constrain 
the potential and limits of new cooperation structures to reduce the governance gap and facilitate the creation of a 
favourable environment for renewable energy investment. This case study is based on data from several sources, 
including official documents, technical reports, literature as well elite interviews conducted between in Europe, the 
US and the MENA between 2012 and 2014. 
3.1. Technical cooperation: between exchange of knowledge and capacity development 
With the advent of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a set of regional programmes of technical 
assistance on renewable energy were established since 2007: Electricity market integration (Immelect), 
Mediterranean energy market integration programme (Med-emip), Energy efficiency in construction (Med-enec), 
Mediterranean energy agencies network (Med-ener), Mediterranean energy regulators (Med-reg), and most recently 
Mediterranean transmission system operators (Med-TSO). Likewise, a Cairo-based Regional centre for renewable 
energy and energy efficiency (Recreee) has consolidated in recent years as a reference structure for technical 
cooperation in the region. Technical cooperation is making important progress in terms of development and 
enhancement of technical capacities. Here cooperation takes the shape of information networks, facilitating the 
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exchange of technical knowledge, best practices, and mutual learning. Also, bilateral forms of technical assistance 
that were initially devised to facilitate legislative approximation, regulatory convergence and institution-building in 
the accession countries, i.e. Twinning, TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchanges) and SIGMA 
(Support for Improvement in Governance and Management), were extended to the neighbourhood under the ENP. 
However, specific activities in the energy sector have remained very limited and for the most part directed to 
Ukraine. 
3.2. Industrial Initiatives: struggling to develop a clear project pipeline in the MENA    
The  roots  of  the  new  industrial initiatives can  be  found  in  the  Trans-Mediterranean Renewable  Energy 
Cooperation Network – a partnership between the Club of Rome, the Hamburg Climate Protection Foundation and 
the National Energy Research Centre of Jordan founded in 2003. In collaboration with scientists of the German 
Aerospace Centre (DLR), this elite-driven initiative developed the so-called Desertec concept, i.e. a vision of an EU- 
MENA community of shared clean energy and water interests. In Germany, the Desertec concept gained increasing 
political support thanks of the Greens and was propelled by domestic pioneering renewable energy industry. During 
the German presidency semester (January-July 2007), the Desertec project become increasingly attractive since 
European leaders approved an EU-wide target to cover 20 percent of their national energy needs from renewable 
energy sources at the European Council in March 2007. A White Book for Desertec was presented at the European 
Parliament in November 2007, and the Desertec concept begun to receive increasing support in Brussels [14]. 
Germany took advantage of its formal role and weight in the Union to reach the above political agreement at the 
European Council level and propelled the negotiations process that brought to the adoption of the Climate action and 
renewable energy (Care) legislative package in April 2009. Among the pieces included in the Care, Directive 
2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources stands out in the present case. In detail, 
Article 9 virtually allows member states to import green electricity from third countries. 
In January 2009, a Desertec Foundation was founded as a non-profit foundation with the aim of promoting the 
realisation of the Desertec concept worldwide. In July 2009, a group of 13 (mostly German) private companies 
launched a Desertec industrial initiative (Dii) with the aim of making the Desertec vision a reality by 2050. In July 
2010, another  French industrial consortium called Medgrid was founded  with a  specific aim to  promote the 
construction of power transmission lines in the Mediterranean region. Most recently, an Italian industrial initiative 
have been created under the label of Renewable energy solutions for the Mediterranean (Res4Med).  
Born to facilitate the work of the private sector in the MENA, these industrial initiatives have found themselves 
changing their initial business models and strategies. At first the Desertec concept started out with the aim of 
developing large-scale CSP projects across the MENA, with estimated costs of €400 billion by 2050 [15]. Dii 
initially responded to this concept and business model, and was characterised by a strong presence of German 
industry within the consortium. When the global downturn stepped in, this business model certainly became over-
ambitious. Dii had to face the defection of key German shareholders Bosch, Siemens, E.ON and associated partner 
Bilfinger – which changed their business strategies, in  some cases (i.e. Siemens) even closing down their CSP 
departments. The lack of a clear project pipeline in the MENA and greater opportunities for project development 
closer to home were key factors behind this German exodus.  
Dii, Res4Med and Medgrid have converged towards more diversified and realistic business models in a context 
of global downturn – taking up a role as enabler of small, medium and also large-scale solar and wind projects. Yet 
these industrial initiatives face many national and transnational hurdles such as insufficient transmission grid 
capacity, political uncertainty, the need for enabling regulatory frameworks, and a general lack of tenders in the 
MENA. 
3.3. Intergovernmental cooperation: when policy confronts politics 
The European Union (EU) and its MENA neighbours launched  in July 2008 the  Mediterranean Solar Plan 
(MSP) – a regional initiative of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) aimed at developing 20 Gigawatts of 
additional installed renewable energy capacity in region by 2020 along with the necessary electricity transmission 
capacity and cross- border interconnections [16].  
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This political initiative traces back to former President Nicolas Sarkozy’s electoral promise to create a 
Mediterranean Union (exclusively between the Southern European countries and the MPCs), which was intended to 
be formalised during the French presidency semester (July-December 2008). Germany firmly opposed to this 
proposal that was to exclude the EU bureaucracies and the Northern member states. A deal between Sarkozy and 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel was ultimately reached in Hanover in March 2008, paving the way for the Union 
for the Mediterranean under the umbrella of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. As the price for German support 
on this initiative, France included in Paris Declaration a commitment to study the feasibility and development of a 
Mediterranean Solar Plan [17]. However, behind the political level there is more than meets the eye. German high 
officials initially wanted the EU’s MSP to play a pivotal role in promoting regulatory convergence between two 
sides of the Mediterranean. French technocrats were rather oriented towards a more pragmatic approach [18] which 
particularly resembles to a niche-based transition [19]. To succeed, in other words, the MSP initially requires niche-
pilot projects protected from the dominant fossil fuel-electricity production regime. If these pilot projects are 
successful, they can provoke a wider change so that a meso-level policy regime would consolidate. 
In February 2010, an ad-hoc experts group examined a strategy paper for the Mediterranean Solar Plan, calling 
on the UfM Secretariat to develop a ‘master plan’ with specific guidelines for the large scale deployment of 
renewable energy projects under the MSP. Such a master plan would develop an approach for a phased development 
of renewable energy technology in the Mediterranean. After this preparation stage, the deployment phase of the 
MSP would follow a specific roadmap contained in the master plan - detailing the phases, activities and precise 
timelines. At the same time, the European Commission launched in May 2010 a technical assistance project named 
‘Paving the way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan’. With €4.6 million of budget, this project brought together a 
consortium of consulting and energy companies to work on overlapping subjects [20]. 
At the 1st Joint Committee of National Experts for the MSP held in Barcelona on July 2011, the technical works 
on the master plan were divided into five specific issues: policy and regulatory frameworks; funding and support 
schemes; physical infrastructures; renewable energy as an industrial policy tool; know-how transfer and capacity 
development. Since then, the UfM Secretariat initiated a participatory process that brought together Member States 
representatives and stakeholders to build a shared regional vision for the MSP. 
Later such a process demonstrated to be more complex than expected. After frequent meetings taking place 
during more than two years at both expert and senior officials’ level, an ‘extremely low-common-denominator 
vision’ was achieved on paper in Jordan on May 2013. After this date, the process moved from the technical to the 
political level. The master plan was supposed to be submitted to the UfM Energy Ministerial Conference for 
political endorsement in December of the same year, but did not make it to the final stage. While objections in this 
area of Euro-Med cooperation traditionally originated from the South, this time it was Madrid that objected to the 
submission of the master plan to the Energy Ministers. The final result was a somewhat ‘empty’ Ministerial 
Conference, which however saw a renewed support of all the Southern Mediterranean countries towards renewables.  
The objections by Madrid were mainly due to two factors: (a) a political refusal to clean electricity trade from 
Morocco to Europe when there is an overcapacity of clean electricity in Spain; (b) technical reasons, i.e. Madrid was 
not fine with the proposal of  statistical transfer (rather than physical transfer) of electricity as proposed by Germany 
and Morocco [21]. Likewise, Madrid sought to use its position in an effort to unlock negotiations in Brussels on the 
reinforcement of its cross-border interconnections with France – which historically maintained Spain and Portugal in 
the condition of an “electricity island” [22].  
As a matter of fact, renewable energy cooperation in the MENA is already beneficial to the Spanish industry – 
which has some of the main constructors in different projects (e.g. Acciona for Ouarzazate Noor I). Certain is that 
Spain-Morocco cooperation could be very beneficial to Spain in the mid/long-term, unleashing possibilities to better 
integrate renewables into the energy mix in both countries. By managing intermittency in a larger grid, one could 
provide base load with renewables. Better connection of this larger grid with the European grid would offer export 
avenues for Spanish overcapacity via France. In a context of general recession and electricity surplus, Madrid found 
itself with no other options than objecting to the submission of the master plan to the UfM Energy Ministerial 
Conference of December 2013.  
At the end of the day, intergovernmental cooperation was unable to deliver clear regional governance for 
renewable energy. This calls for a renewed responsibility of all national governments to escape politics and deliver 
sound policy – if we ever want to seriously develop renewable energy in the MENA.  
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3.4. Concessional finance and the case of Ouarzazate Noor I CSP plant 
The case of Morocco tells us that domestic policy efforts can make a difference in renewable energy project 
development. The new windows of opportunity opened by increasing political and economic actors in Europe 
triggered a specific domestic reform pattern in Rabat. With the Renewable Energy Law of 2010 [23], Morocco set 
out a legislative framework for the promotion of renewable investments, establishing a procedure for the 
authorisation of renewable energy installations as well as regulating the production, distribution, trade and even the 
export of green electricity [24]. Additionally, Morocco underwent two relevant institutional reforms in the same 
year. First, a Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN) was created by law [25] with the mandate to undertake 
economic and technical feasibility studies, promote the national activities to the foreign investors and donor 
community and operate as key contractor for solar energy projects.  Second, the pre-existing  Centre  for  the  
Development  of  Renewable  Energy  was  transformed  by  law  [26]  in  to  a  technical institutional structure re-
named as National Agency for the Promotion of Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation with the  specific 
mandate to  supervise and  coordinate renewable energy and  energy efficiency programmes at national and sub-
national level.  Two main reasons account for this domestic reform pattern. (a) In this country, the renewable sub-
sector reform trajectory builds upon a positive past experience, i.e. the General Programme for Rural Electrification 
(1994-2010). A country with modest financial resources to cope with complex energy infrastructure projects, 
Morocco was able to meet the sufficient legislative and technical standards required at international level as to 
obtain significant international cooperation financial support for the above programme. This positive past experience 
raised the consciousness of national elites and technocrats in the fact that the donor community may fund projects 
and help leveraging private investment only if governments take action and demonstrate sufficient technical capacity 
[27].  (b) Lacking the hydrocarbons reserves of its neighbours, Morocco currently imports 94,6% of its energy [28].  
Demand is expected to nearly quadruplicate by 2030 [29].  As a result, Morocco has an ‘urgent need’ to develop its 
renewable energy capacity and, under the current national energy strategy, intend to cover up to 15% of Morocco’s 
energy mix from renewable sources by 2020 [30]. 
The ultimate aim of Rabat was to make the first move, capturing increasing concessional finance devoted to 
renewable projects by development banks and international donors, and beginning to tap the large solar and wind 
potential at disposal. These efforts paid off. The bid for a 160 megawatt Ouarzazate Noor I CSP project was 
awarded in September 2012 to a consortium led by Saudi energy developer ACWA Power International, with 
Spanish Acciona becoming the leading constructor. The value of the bid stood at $795 million, the largest ever 
within the total renewable energy investment towards the MENA. Financing required equity and debt capital from 
both public and private investors, namely $120 million of equity capital from the project developers, $40 million of 
equity capital from MASEN, and $635 million debt from multiple lenders (with the CTF leading the way with a 
$197 million concessional loan) [31]. Concessional finance is aimed at generating economies of scale in equipment 
manufacturing that can progressively bring costs down and generate a virtuous cycle – creating jobs, know-how, and 
furthering technology development on site [32].  Noor I have reached 40% of the construction phase, and will be 
operational by the end of June 2015 [33]. 
4. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis highlights a picture in which the turn to integovernmentalism and the role of member 
states therein had a remarkable impact on the resulting patterns of renewable energy cooperation in the MENA. 
These dynamics have striking implications in the case of the Mediterranean Solar Plan. Politics have prevailed over 
policy. Emerging structures of renewable energy cooperation were not able to reduce the governance gap in the 
MENA and create a favorable environment for public and private finance. Thus, a far more synergic governance is 
needed if we ever want to overcome the many (non-political) barriers behind a broad transition to renewables across 
the MENA. Three scenarios are discussed here as follows. 
Business-as-usual. Outcomes are rarely optimal. There is inaction at regional governance level. Individual 
MENA countries undertake limited policy action. Investment is lagging behind at regional level, concentrated in few 
countries rather than the whole region. A region-wide transition to renewable energy is unlikely. 
Network-steered transition (short/medium term).  Policy action takes place progressively through technical 
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cooperation and mutual learning. Initially, this process requires niche-pilot projects protected from the dominant 
fossil fuel-electricity production regime. If pilot projects are successful, they may provoke a wider change in the 
medium term. If they fail, a region-wide transition is unlikely. Monitoring and benchmarking systems are 
established, so that involved countries know about each other’s progress. 
Mediterranean energy community-transition (long-term).  Policy action takes  place  through  well-consented 
mechanisms of cooperation, i.e. aiming at the gradual harmonisation of technical standards. Eventually, a 
multilateral treaty could extend selected parts of the EU renewable energy acquis to MENA countries or new 
jointly-defined rules to the EU and the MENA. This legal commitment is coupled with a set of organisational 
structures which monitor compliance. This solution also requires the launching of innovative financing mechanisms 
which clearly tie together harmonisation of technical standards and public finance. This is the least- likely scenario 
at the moment. 
To this end, intergovernmental cooperation was unable to deliver clear regional governance for renewable 
energy. This calls for a renewed responsibility of all national governments to discharge politics and deliver sound 
policy, if they want to seriously develop renewable energy in the MENA. 
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